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Abstract—Proximity Integrated Circuit Cards (PICC) are
widely used for public transport fare collection. The stored
contents in the card can only be accessed or modified after the
card is able to authenticate the Proximity Coupling Device (PCD)
or reader using a shared secret key.
We propose a new authentication scheme that is not based
on shared secret keys. Instead, authentication is based on the
card and reader being able to compute an identical pairwise key
using their own private keying material obtained from the same
source. The computation is done off-line and does not require the
participation of a third party. It uses simple modular arithmetic
operations over a small binary extension field, achieving fast
computation speed using the limited resources in cards. In
addition, should the keys be stolen from the cards or readers, the
security of the other parts of the system cannot be compromised.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fare collection for public transport systems such as trains,
buses and ferries need to be fast, convenient, and able to
cater for the large number of users at peak periods. Cashless
payment using contactless stored value cards, a type of Prox-
imity Integrated Circuit Card (PICC) also referred to simply
as “cards”, are widely used for this purpose. Examples include
the Oyster card in London, Octopus card in Hong Kong, and
Charlie card in Boston [1]. Commuters pre-purchase credits
which are stored in the cards. When entering and exiting the
transit system, the user touches or “taps” the card against a
Proximity Coupling Device (PCD) (referred to as a “reader”),
which performs read/write operations on the card. At the entry,
the gate is opened if there is sufficient stored value, and at
the exit, the fare is computed and deducted.The transactions
must be fast so as not to impede entrance and exit, allowing
a person to walk past the reader without stopping, typically
within 300 - 500 ms although some transit agencies require
transaction of at most 300 ms [2]. The fast transaction time and
sheer volume of users at peak times means that the transactions
should are done off-line i.e., locally at the reader which may
be fixed or mobile such as in buses. Transaction data may
be offloaded to the central servers at appropriate intervals for
off-line processing, audit, accounting, and fraud detection.
RFID technologies for contactless fare payments typically
implement the ISO/IEC 14443 standard for contactless smart
cards operating at 13.56 MHz where the cards are intended to
operate within 10 cm of the reader [3]. The MIFARE classic
and DESFire farecards are examples of cards used in transit
systems.
The cards are passively powered and have limited com-
putational resources. To perform authentication fast enough,
the authentication algorithm uses symmetric key cryptographic
methods based on a secret key shared between the card and
the reader, e.g. in the MIFARE cards [4]. The reader and
card prove that they possess the same secret key in order to
authenticate each other.
The shared secret key becomes the valued target for attack-
ers. The cards are easily available and the attacker has full
control of it once it is obtained. To protect the secret key, it
is stored in tamper proof area in the card and cannot be read
from outside the card. Nevertheless there has been reports that
the shared key can be stolen. For example, it was demonstrated
in [5] where, by exploiting weaknesses in the CRYPTO1
algorithm used in the MIFARE Classic card, it was possible
to obtain the key by reversely engineering the chip. The more
advanced MIFARE DESFire EV1 card which uses the AES
algorithm is also vulnerable as demonstrated in [6]. Here the
authors used a side channel attack where, by measuring the
electromagnetic emanations during cryptographic operations,
they were able to recover the secret 3DES key. Once the key
is obtained, the cards can be cloned as demonstrated in [7].
There are also reports of invasive attacks using various tools
to strip away the physical protective layers and analyse the
silicon die to obtain the contents of flash, ROM, FPGAs, etc.
[8].
Our Contribution: We propose a new mechanism for
authentication between the card and reader that does not use
a shared secret key. Instead, the reader and card prove that
they each possess unique secret keying material obtained from
the same trusted source. It is an off-line process and does
not require the participation of a third party. The two devices
only need to use their counterpart’s IDs with their own private
keying material to compute a pairwise key which, if identical,
authenticates each other. The computations use simple modular
multiplications and additions over a small extension field,
GF (2b) where typically, b = 5. The scheme can be easily
implemented in hardware making it extremely fast.
II. RELATED WORK
Light weight methods: RFIDs, being extremely con-
strained in resources need to use lightweight authentication
methods including the above mentioned shared secret key
method. In addition, a family of authentication schemes based
on the Hopper-Blum protocol [9] have been proposed, e.g.
[10]. The main benefits are in the simple computations using
modular arithmetic on binary data. However, the tag and reader
also share the same secret key and are subject to the weakness
that, if the key is cracked, the system is broken.
PKI ECC methods: RFID smart cards which have Public
Key Cryptographic (PKC) functions built into the chips are
available and are used in most credits cards. The PKC schemes
use a public-private key pair for encryption, decryption, and
signature generation and verification in the authentication
process. If the private key is stolen, only that particular card
is affected. PKC algorithms involve computationally expensive
operations including exponentiations and multiplications and
for security, use large integers of hundreds or thousands of bits.
Usually the more efficient Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
methods are used as they use integers of only hundreds of bits.
For security strength equivalent to 80-bit symmetric keys ECC-
163 using 163-bit numbers is used, and for 128-bit security
ECC-283 is required. ECC-163 have been demonstrated to be
suitable for implementation in RFID hardware. The important
considerations for RFID application are computation time,
digital circuit complexity denoted as Gate Equivalent (GE),
and the energy required. The work in [11] showed that it is
possible to implement ECC-163 point multiplication which
took 300,000 clock cycles requiring 11,904 GE, using 8.57
µW. At 13.56 MHz, this is about 22 ms. The more recent
work in [12] designed an ECC-163 processor which took
176,700 clock cycles which at 13.56 MHz, takes about 13.1
ms. It required about 13.8 K GE and consumed 253 µW
of power. Authentication using PKC methods require several
ECC operations for signing and verifying signatures. The
devices also need to exchange their public keys and signatures
which requires transmission of hundreds of bits. The work in
[13] designed an ECC authentication scheme using Schnorr’s
signature, and encryption using the linear feedback shift
register (LFSR). They simulated the implementation using an
FPGA. They did not give figures on the overall performance
but presented results for one scalar EC scalar multiplication
which took 170 K cycles, required 208.4 µW, and required
21.8 K GE. At 13.56 MHz, this would take about 12.5 ms
for one multiplication. As more than one EC multiplication
is required as well as other operations for generating and
verifying signatures, encryption, decryption, etc., this may not
be sufficiently fast for farecard transactions.
III. BYKA AUTHENTICATION FOR RFID
Our proposal uses the newly developed Blom-Yang key
agreement scheme (BYka) [14] as the authentication mech-
anism between the reader and card.
A. Operation Scenario
The transport company obtains blank cards from a man-
ufacturer with all the algorithms built into the fare card
chip. Each card has a unique ID hardwired into the chip
during manufacture and this cannot be altered. This feature
is commonly available, for example the MIFARE DESFire
fare cards has a unique 7 byte serial number (UID) in locked
write-protected non-volatile memory during manufacture [15].
The cards are “uninitialised” and do not have any keying
material stored in them. The company has a trusted Key
Authority (KA) which generates all the keying material and
stores them separately in a secure server database. When the
user purchases a fare card, the ticket vendor takes a blank card
and “initialises” it by retrieving the keying material matching
the card ID from the server, and writing it into the secure
storage area in the card. The storage area should be unreadable
from outside the card with access to it broken to prevent
reinitialisation or further editing. After this the card can be
used to enter and exit the transit system gates for trains, buses,
ferries, etc., in the company’s system. The user can purchase
more credit by presenting the card at the vendor which uses a
PCD reader to update the stored value in modifiable memory.
Card usage and operations: All transactions between the
card and reader takes place off-line locally at the gates. These
include authentication, fare computation, and updating the
stored values. Transaction records including card and reader
IDs, time, stored values, fare collection, etc. are stored locally
in the reader and may be uploaded when appropriate to a
central server for other purposes such as auditing, accounting,
fraud detection, etc.
B. Definition of terms
The following defines some of the terms used in this paper.
Genuine: A card or reader is considered “genuine” if it
is issued by the company, and all its contents are written using
the company’s authorized PCD’s readers only.
Fake: A card or reader is considered a “fake” if some
or all of its contents are written by non-company readers, for
example, an attacker’s reader. The card may have previously
been a genuine one but its contents have been altered by the
attacker. It may also be an uninitialised card stolen from the
store and written with contents by an attacker. In all these
cases, the IDs of the cards are unchanged.
Clone: A “clone” is defined as a hardware or software
device constructed with an exact copy of all the components of
a genuine device including its ID, private keys, etc., and is able
to fully to function just like the genuine device. For example,
it may be an card or reader emulator constructed of hardware
and software using stolen keys and IDs. In addition, it may
also be able to implement without detection, other nefarious
functions not normally done in genuine devices.
C. Attacker Capabilities
We assume that the attacker is able to obtain genuine fare
cards, for example by purchasing them from the counter. It is
also able to obtain genuine uninitialised cards, for example by
theft or other means, from the manufacturer’s or the company’s
stores. However, the attacker cannot modify the cards’ unique
IDs.
It is now accepted that, using invasive or non-invasive
techniques, the attacker can extract all the cards’ contents
including sensitive cryptographic material. The attacker is also
able to implement all the operations, algorithms, etc. just like
a genuine device. As a result, the attacker is able to modify
the contents of genuine cards, fabricate fake cards, construct
clones to emulate as cards, readers, etc. The feasibility of such
an attack has been demonstrated in [7].
While the readers installed in stations, buses, etc. can be
monitored, we also assume that they can be stolen and their
private keys obtained.
IV. THE BYKA SCHEME
Our scheme for authentication between the reader and card
uses the BYka scheme [14] which enables these two devices
who have not previously communicated with each other, to
compute a shared secret pairwise key after obtaining each
other’s IDs. This is only possible if each device has a private
key-set derived from its own ID and the master key kept by the
company. In this way, all devices belonging to the company are
able to compute pairwise keys with each other as they share a
common “ancestor” – the company’s master key. Each private
key-set is unique and if stolen, affects only the compromised
device.
The following notations are used in our scheme:
N – number of master key matrices
m – dimension of matrices and vectors
η – number of ID vectors per device
p – an irreducible polynomial
b – the degree of p
V – public key-set, an η×m matrix
M – master key, an m×m matrix
K – private key-set, an Nη×m matrix
P – pairwise key-set, an Nη×η matrix
A. System setup
a) Administrator: An administrator is one or any number
of entities responsible for setting up the whole system includ-
ing initialising the PCD readers and PICC cards with their
keying material, stored values, and other administrative data.
b) Public key-set V: Each device has a unique ID. A
known algorithm g(·) is used with the ID to generate η column
vectors called the public key-set comprising η (m×1) column
vectors Vi,··· ,η , and each element is in GF (2b). For example,
device A with IDA has the public key-set,
VA = g(IDA) =
[
VA1 VA2 · · · VAη
]
(1)
The public key-set vectors satisfy the following conditions:
1. Each Vxi is unique across the whole system
2. They are linearly independent
The IDs of the cards and readers, and the algorithm g(·) are
publicly known.
c) Key Authority, KA: A Key Authority (KA) is re-
sponsible for generating and safeguarding the system’s N
master key-set, M = {M1,M1, · · · ,MN}. Each M is an
m×m symmetric matrix with random elements in GF (2b).
For additional security, the KA can comprise several separate
entities, each one responsible for independently generating and
storing one or more of the N master keys.
d) Private key-set K: This is a set of Nη row vectors,
secret and unique for each device generated by the KA using
its master key-set and the device’s ID. The KA first generates
the public key-set for the card, e.g. A using (1). Then the KA
computes the private key-set KA as follows,
for i = 1, · · · , N and j = 1, · · · , η
KAij = V
T
Aj ·Mi (mod p) (2)
Each KAij is a (1×m) row vector. They are stored in the
private key-set matrix in a random order.
KTA =
[
KTA11 K
T
A12 · · · KTANη
]
The private key-set matrix needs to be loaded into the
card before it can be used. This can be done either during
manufacture or when it is purchased.
e) Pairwise key-set P: When two devices, say reader
A and card B need to obtain their pairwise key, they first
exchange their IDs. Then, using each other’s ID, they derive
their counterpart’s public key-sets from the ID using (1). The
reader obtains VB and the card obtains VA. Each device then
computes their pairwise key-set P as follows.
Reader A:
PAB = KA · VB (mod p) (3)
PAB is an Nη×η matrix with elements (VTAjMi)VBk where
i = 1, · · · , N and j, k = 1, · · · , η.
Similarly, card B:
PBA = KB · VA (mod p) (4)
The elements of PBA are similarly VTBjMiVAk . Consider an
element and its transpose, (VTBjMiVAk)
T = VTAkM
T
i VBj .
Since Mi is symmetric, and the matrix VTAjMiVB is scalar,
the two matrices PAB and PBA have identical elements but
located in different positions. Each device use these elements
to construct a pairwise key of the desired length using some
algorithm fk(·), i.e.,
Reader R: KAB = fk(PAB)
device B: KBA = fk(PBA)
and KAB = KBA
For example, a possible algorithm for fk(·) is to multiply all
the non-zero elements together modular a suitable irreducible
polynomial to give the required key size. Finally, a joint
session key Ks can be constructed by using another function
fs(·), for example a hash function, with KAB or KBA and n,
a random number as inputs. How the number n is shared will
be describe as follow.
B. Authentication protocol
The ISO/IEC-14443-3 protocol has 3 phases. The initialisa-
tion and anti-collision phase commences when a card comes
into proximity with a reader. At the end of this phase, the
reader has obtained the ID of the card, and the card is in an
active state. The authentication phase follows where the reader
and card authenticates each other using random challenges
encrypted using their shared secret key. Three exchanges
are required. Then the application phase commences where
commands are sent to the card.
Our scheme implements all the operational sequences of the
above ISO/IEC-14443-3 protocol. The only difference is the
use of a computed pairwise session key in the authentication
phase.
Initialisation phase: When the user presents his/her card
denoted as B, by bringing it near a reader denoted as A, the
initialization and anti-collision phase proceeds as in ISO/IEC
protocol. On completion, the reader has obtained the IDB of
the card, and the card is now in an active state.
Authentication phase:
Step 1. PCD Reader: The reader with IDA having
obtained the IDB of card B derives the public key-set
VB = g(IDB). Using this, it computes the pairwise key-set
PAB using Eqn. (3) from which it generates a pairwise key
KAB = fk(PAB). It also generates two random numbers:
n which is used with KAB to obtain the joint session key
Ks = fs(KAB , n), and cA which is used as a challenge. It
then constructs the message, M1 = {IDA ‖ n ‖ E(cA ‖ n)Ks}
and sends it to the card.
1 : A→ B : M1 = {IDA ‖ n ‖ E(cA ‖ n)Ks}
Step 2. PICC Card: The card obtains IDA, derives the
public key-set VA = g(IDA), computes the pairwise key-set
PBA using Eqn. (4) and then obtains KBA = fk(PBA) and
then the joint session key Ks = fs(KBA, n). The decrypted n
is compared to the clear text n, and if verified, it retrieves the
challenge cA and computes the required response rA = cA+1.
It then generates its own random challenge cB , constructs the
message M2 = E(rA ‖ cB)Ks , and sends it to the reader.
2 : B→ A : M2 = {E(rA ‖ cB)Ks}
Step 3. Reader Verification: The reader decrypts M2
using the session key Ks, checks that rA = cA + 1. If
verified, the reader is assured that card with IDB possess the
private key-set computed from IDB by the KA, and is thus
genuine. It computes the response rB = cB+1 and updates its
challenge c′A = rA. It is now ready to move to the application
phase, for example to read the stored value in the card by
issuing the command cmd. It constructs an encrypted message
M3 = E(c
′
A ‖ rB ‖ cmd)Ks and sends it to the card.
3 : A→ B : M3 = {E(c′A ‖ rB ‖ cmd)Ks}
The card decrypts M3 and after verifying the response rB =
cB + 1, the card is assured that the other party is indeed one
with the claimed IDA which also obtained its private key-set
from the trusted KA. After this, it transits to the application
phase.
Application phase: The operations of the application
phase, such as reading and updating contents, etc., proceeds
as usual without any change. All transactions are encrypted
using the session key Ks and each message includes a new
challenge and a response to the previously received challenge.
In this way all messages are part of a stream initiated by the
reader.
C. Security of the scheme
We consider attacks on the scheme on two fronts – the
card itself, and the protocol. For the attacks on the card, it is
assumed that the attacker is able to obtain as many genuine
cards as necessary. We assume that the attacker is able to
extract the private key-sets from cards even though these are
stored in a secure unreadable area in the card. We also assume
that the PCD readers can be stolen from unattended buses,
stations, etc. and their keys obtained.
Attacks on card: The attacker can attempt to:
1. Recover the master key matrices
2. Fabricate fake cards
3. Clone cards and readers
1. Recovering the master keys: If the master key matrices
can be recovered, the attacker would be able to clone readers,
fabricate fare cards, etc., and compromise the entire system.
This is equivalent to compromising a globally shared secret
key. Various attacks to recover the master keys from captured
private keys were analysed in [16] in which it was shown
that the BYka scheme was resilient against these attacks. The
main features enabling the scheme to be resilient are briefly
described as follows.
The BYka scheme is based on Blom’s scheme [17]. Here,
there is one master key M which is a symmetric (m×m)
matrix, and each device has one public key (m×1) vector
V and one private key (1×m) row vector K = VTM (mod
n), a prime number. After devices A and B obtained each
other’s public key vectors, they compute their pairwise key
KAB = (VTAM)VB (mod n) and KBA = (V
T
BM)VA (mod
n), respectively. The key size is the same size as n. The Blom’s
scheme is unconditionally secure if all the public key vectors
are linearly independent, and no more than (m−1) private key
vectors are stolen [18]. Otherwise, if non-linearly independent
public key vectors are used, the attacker would be able to
fabricate new valid public and private key vectors using linear
combinations of the captured ones. More drastically, if m or
more private key vectors are obtained, the attacker can use
them to construct a system of linear equations whose solution
is the master key matrix itself.
The BYka scheme however, is able to remain resilient
against any number of private key-sets being stolen by using
multiple keys, random storage of the private key-set vectors,
and with operations over a small finite field. Here, the KA has a
master key-set comprising N master key matrices. Each device
has a public key-set comprising η vectors used in permutation
to obtain the Nη vectors in the private key-set. Now, before the
stolen private key-set can be used to construct the system of
equations, each private key-set vector must first be associated
with the particular public key vector and master key matrix
used to compute it, i.e. discover the private-public-master key
association (PPMka). As the the public key vectors are unique,
the private key-set vectors storage are in a random order, and
the operations are over a very small finite field of b bits, the
PPMKa cannot be easily found. The analysis in [16] showed
that by selecting suitable values of N, η,m, b the number of
possible PPMka’s from captured keys using the most efficient
method can be made so large that it requires an infeasible
number of attempts, e.g. 280 or 2128. Based on the notion of
security strength in the NIST Standard [19], we consider these
to be of security strengths 80-bits and 128-bits respectively.
2. Fabricate fake cards: Assume that the attacker is able
to obtain blank cards which have not been initialised, for
example by stealing from the company’s store or from the
manufacturer. Assume also that the attacker is able to obtain all
the keying material from card B. The attacker is able to write
the private key-set KB into a blank card with IDX , creating a
fake card since the ID cannot be changed. However this card is
unusable as the private key-set is unrelated to the fake card’s
IDX . When this fake card is presented to a genuine reader,
say A, the reader obtains IDX and computes the pairwise
key-set PAX = KA · VX . Meanwhile, the card obtains IDA
and computes a different pairwise key-set PBA = KB · VA.
Since the fake card B and reader C are not able to obtain the
same session key, the authentication fails. In this way, stolen
blank cards are useless unless the private key-sets matching
the stolen card IDs are stolen from the secure server as well.
The attacker can attempt to construct a valid private key-set
for IDX using suitable linear combinations of compromised
private key-sets, a possibility in the original Blom’s scheme.
However, in the BYka scheme, the attacker must first discover
the PPMka’s which is infeasible.
3. Clone cards and readers : Using stolen keying material
from a card, the attacker is able to construct a (hardware or
software) reader or card emulator using the matching ID and
private key-set. The card emulator can be used as a fare card at
genuine readers. By repeatedly cloning new cards, the attacker
can obtain unlimited travel.
The attacker may also attempt to build a reader emulator
and use it to modify stored values in genuine cards. If this
is successful, the attacker would be able to masquerade as
a vendor to collect payments and use the reader to recharge
genuine cards. Our scheme has a simple mechanism to prevent
PCD reader cloning attacks using stolen PICC card keys. In
our scheme, the cards and readers are assigned IDs from
different ranges. For example, card IDs are 7 bytes long, while
reader IDs are only 6 bytes. Genuine PICCs are designed
and built with hardware to handle only 6 byte-IDs, i.e. only
from genuine readers. The reader cloned with keying material
derived from the 7-byte ID of the compromised card cannot
be authenticated by a genuine card.
If the keys are stolen from PCD readers, they can be
used to clone readers. Our scheme is able to support suitable
countermeasures. As each transaction is possible only if both
parties use their real IDs related to their private key-sets, the
reader ID, together with time, location, etc., can be recorded in
the card at each transaction. These records can be captured by
genuine readers when the card is used. The information can be
used by other off-line fraud detection systems to detect cloned
PCDs readers and cards.
Attacks on the protocol: It is assumed that the attacker
is able to record messages between the reader and a genuine
card using some device. The attacker can attempt to replay
messages with the aim to reset the value of the card, or report
a false stored value at entrance gates, etc.
Consider that an attacker purchases new credit for a genuine
card at an unattended recharging station, and all messages
between the card and reader during the transaction were
recorded. When the card value is depleted, the attacker would
attempt to send the recorded messages to reset the card with
the previously purchased credit. Our scheme protects against
replay attacks by requiring each message received by the card
to contain the appropriate response to the challenge contained
in the previous message sent. As a new random challenge is
generated for each new session, a replayed message would
have only a very small chance of having the correct response
to the current challenge and would be rejected. Similarly,
replaying an old message containing a larger stored value to
a reader would be easily detected.
V. DISCUSSION
Transmission: The authentication process requires the
devices to send their IDs to their counterparts. This is a basic
requirement for transactions in general, and by just exchanging
these few ID bits, our scheme enables the reader and card to
derive a pairwise session key for authenticating each other.
Performance and GE: The design and hardware imple-
mentation of our scheme is left to a future work. Here we
only sketch out the expected performance and GE required
by comparing with other work, and by conducting some
preliminary design investigations.
Computation time: On top of the time required in the
ISO/IEC-14443-3 scheme for generating, encrypting, decrypt-
ing and verifying the challenges, ours requires additional time
to compute the pairwise key. This involves generation of η
public key-set vectors, Nη2m modular multiplications of b-bit
operands, and derivation of the pairwise key using a suitable
method, for example by multiplying the Nη2 pairwise key-set
elements together modular a 128-bit irreducible polynomial.
The most intensive operation is the modular multiplication.
This can be efficiently implemented in hardware using, for
example, the Montgomery modular multiplication algorithm.
There have been a lot of studies done on efficient hardware
implementation of the Montgomery multiplier, especially for
use with large finite fields. As an indication, the work in [20]
reported its implementation in hardware in which the modular
multiplication took at most b 23 (b+2)c+3 cycles with operands
of b = 128, 256, and 512 bits. With b = 5 in our case, each
multiplication would require at most 8 clock cycles, and with
N = 9, η = 5,m = 26 for 128 bit security, the total time to
obtain the pairwise key would be 49.2 ms @ 13.56 MHz.
Gate Equivalent: Our scheme requires one 5×5-bit mul-
tiplier and one 5×128-bit modular multiplier. Considering that
the ECC-163 implementation in [12] required 13.8 K GE, our
requirement should be less.
Preliminary design investigations: Our modular multipli-
cations using small operands of b = 5 bits allow the possibility
of implementations using a lookup table or the schoolbook
shift and add method.
The lookup table method is extremely area consuming but
very fast. Our preliminary design for the 5-bit modular mul-
tiplication table using decoders and encoders would require
around 10,025 GE, and each look up takes only a couple of
clock cycles.
The schoolbook modular multiplication using the shift and
add method requires at most 15 clock cycles to do one
multiplication. Overall, it would take around 110 K cycles to
obtain the 128-bit pairwise key using N = 9, η = 5,m = 26
and b = 5. At 13.56 MHz this amounts to around 8.1 ms. Only
a few 5-bit registers and 128-bit registers are used, requiring
a total of around 1836 GE.
Private key storage: The private key-set consists of
Nηmb bits, for example 5850 bits. Its large size also serves as
a deterrent against attempts to steal it using brute force or other
attacks such as those involving physical invasive methods.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proximity farecards play a vital role in modern public
transport systems. However, the low computational power of
the embedded chips, the requirements for fast transaction at
the entry and exit gates, and the large number of devices
in use tend to limit the authentication methods to those
using shared secret keys. A new scheme in which the reader
and farecard computes their pairwise key for authentication
is proposed. It operates off-line and does not require the
participation of a third party. It has minimum communication
overheads and the two devices only need to exchange their
IDs in order compute their pairwise key. As it uses simple
modular arithmetic operations over a small binary extension
field, it is fast and requires little computing resources making it
very suitable for transportation system farecards. An important
feature is that, even if the private keying material of a large
number of farecards are stolen, the impact is limited and
cannot compromise the whole system.
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